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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SURVEY

INTRODUCTION

During the 1994 term, the Tenth Circuit frequently addressed the Fourth
Amendment implications of the stop and detention of suspects and their
luggage by law enforcement officers. In United States v. Little,' the court
clarified the legal standard for evaluating whether police-citizen encounters
aboard public transportation constitute a seizure of the citizen. The Tenth
Circuit held that the proper Constitutional test, as set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Florida v. Bostick2 , must consider the "totality of the
circumstances," not merely the location of the encounter.' In doing so, the
Tenth Circuit overruled any contrary opinions that would lead lower courts to
apply a per se rule classifying police-citizen encounters aboard public transportation as seizures.' The court addressed additional personal detention questions pertaining to border patrol operations in United States v. LopezMartinez,' and the proper scope of a detention in United States v.
Fernandez.6

In a related trend, the Tenth Circuit confronted the issue of force or show
of force in conducting a "Terry stop"7 of a suspect in United States v.
Melendez-Garcia' The court recognized that force may be required as a precaution in conducting a Terry stop of a dangerous suspect. However, it emphasized that the government must demonstrate that the facts available to the
officer conducting the stop would warrant an officer of reasonable caution to
believe that the use of force was appropriate under the circumstances. 9 Failing
this justification, the use of force transforms a Terry stop into a full custodial
arrest requiring probable cause.'0
In United States v. Moore," the Tenth Circuit addressed the seizure and
detention of a suspect's luggage. The court held that two factors articulated by
the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officers established reasonable suspicion
justifying the detention of the defendant's bag:' 2 1) the suspects paid extra to
purchase their tickets at the last minute; and 2) they lied about their place of
embarkation."

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

18 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir. 1994).
501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991).
Little, 18 F.3d at 1503-04.
Id. at 1504.
25 F.3d 1481 (10th Cir. 1994).
18 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1994).
See infra text accompanying notes 15-18.
28 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1052.
Id. at 1053.
22 F.3d 241 (10th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 243-44.
Id.
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I. SEIZURE OF INDIVIDUALS

A. Background
1. Terry Stops and Reasonable Suspicion
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures not supported by probable cause. 4 In
Terry v. Ohio, 5 the U.S. Supreme Court established the constitutionality of
investigatory detentions by classifying such stops as narrow exceptions to the
probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The Terry Court held
that an officer may stop an individual reasonably suspected of criminal activity, question him briefly, and perform a limited external pat-down frisk for
weapons. 6 The Court determined that short, investigatory detentions resulted
in less of a personal invasion than an arrest, 7 and that they serve an important governmental interest that outweighs their minimal intrusion.'"
Terry stops may be conducted only if the detaining officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a crime is about to be committed. 9 In order to prove reasonable suspicion, the government must point to specific and
articulable facts, together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, that
reasonably suggest that criminal activity has occurred or is imminent." Usually, the basis for reasonable suspicion stems from an officer's personal observations or the collective knowledge of several law enforcement personnel.2'
Normally, courts afford considerable deference in this area to experienced
officers who often infer criminal activity from conduct that appears innocuous
to a lay observer.22 The Supreme Court has held that when considered
through the eyes of a trained and experienced officer, several seemingly innocent activities may add up to reasonable suspicion.23
24
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
the Supreme Court applied the
standard of reasonable suspicion to border patrol operations. Reflecting the
underlying principles of Terry, the Court found that the government's impor-

14. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
16. Id. at 27.
17. Id. at 26.
18. Id. at 26-27.
19. Id. at 21-22.
20. Id. at 21.
21. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 232-35 (1985); Evelyn M. Aswad et
al., Project: Twenty-Third Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court
and Courts of Appeals 1992-1993, 82 GEO. L.J. 622, 624-25 n. 112 (1994).
22. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418-22 (1981); Aswad, supra note 21, at 625-

26 nn.113-14.
23. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989).
24. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
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tant interest in protecting and maintaining its borders, along with the absence
of practical alternatives for policing its borders, outweighed the minimal intrusion of a brief stop. 5 The Court established a non-exhaustive, multi-factor
test26 as a guide for courts evaluating the reasonableness of a border patrol
stop. 7 The experience of border patrol officers, in light of the unique characteristics of their mission, is given noticeable deference when weighing the test
factors."
2. Reasonableness of Terry Stops
A valid investigatory detention must be reasonable in scope, conducted for
a legitimate investigatory purpose, and reasonably related to the circumstances
that initially justified the detention.29 This standard applies to brief stops to
ask questions and ascertain the identity of a person, as well as stopping a
vehicle and ordering the exit of its occupants.3 ° To ensure personal safety, an
officer initiating a Terry stop may conduct an external pat-down frisk of the
detainee to locate weapons. 3 However, when an officer's actions in a Terry
stop exceed those necessary for a minimally-intrusive investigatory detention,
the seizure of an individual becomes an arrest, which must be supported by
probable cause.32
Police can take further precautionary measures beyond a frisk to ensure
their safety, provided that such measures are reasonably necessary under the
circumstances.33 If an officer's actions exceed what is necessary under the
totality of the circumstances, the stop may only be justified by probable cause
or consent.3 4 Although the Supreme Court has readily allowed minimal intrusions on a person's liberty, such as frisks or the request to exit a vehicle,35 it
has also recognized that the use or threat of force, such as handcuffs and
firearms, results in a heightened level of intrusion, thereby requiring a more

25. Id. at 881.
26. The Court listed several factors that officers may consider: 1) characteristics of the area
in which the vehicle is encountered; 2) proximity of the area to the border; 3) "usual patterns of
traffic on the particular road"; 4) the agent's "previous experience with alien traffic"; 5) "information about recent illegal crossings in the area"; 6) driver's behavior, including any obvious attempts at evasion; 7) vehicle characteristics, such as cargo space; and 8) appearance that vehicle is
heavily loaded. Id. at 884-85.
27. The test has been applied, for example, in United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d
1481, 1483-84 (10th Cir. 1994) and in United States v. Monsisvais, 907 F.2d 987, 990 (10th Cir.
1990).
28. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d at 1483-84; Monsisvais, 907 F.2d at 990.
29. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
30. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 146 (1972); Terry, 392 U.S. at 6-7, 22-23.
31. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-26.
32. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502-03 (1983).
33. "Since police officers should not be required to take unnecessary risks in performing
their duties, they are 'authorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their
personal safety and maintain the status quo during the course of [a Terry) stop."' United States v.
Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235
(1985) (alteration in original)).
34. Id.
35. Pennsylvania v. Minms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977); Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
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careful evaluation of its justification.36 The government must demonstrate that
the facts available to an officer using force would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that such action was appropriate under the circumstances.37
3. Determining Seizure of an Individual
In recent years, the Supreme Court has frequently tried to determine when
seizure of an individual occurs incident to a Terry stop. The Terry Court itself
maintained that not all police-citizen encounters result in a seizure of the citizen.3 ' A seizure only occurs when an officer restrains an individual's liberty
by show of authority or physical force.39
In cases following Terry, the Court clarified that a seizure requiring
Fourth Amendment analysis does not occur unless a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave.' In making this determination,
the Court stated that the totality of the circumstances should be considered."
A seizure occurs when a person's belief that his freedom is restricted
results from direct police action and cannot be attributed to other causes.42
The conduct of the police must be intimidating or coercive enough to convince
a reasonable person that he could not disregard the police and go about his
business.43
The Court tightened its seizure determination criteria in California v.
Hodari D." The Court held that Hodari, while being chased by a police officer, was not seized until the officer tackled him.45 Rejecting Hodari's argument that a reasonable person being chased by a police officer would not feel
free to leave, the Court maintained that although a reasonable feeling of

36. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
37. Id. See also Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1463 (use of firearms justified because officers had information suspects may be armed); United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1563 (10th Cir. 1993) (officer acted unreasonably when she drew firearm and handcuffed defendant after noticing defendant
lawfully had firearm in his car); United States v. Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062, 1064 (10th Cir. 1993)
(use of firearms and handcuffs warranted when police were informed suspect had threatened to kill
someone and displayed violent behavior when stopped); United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263,
1273-74 (10th Cir. 1982) (police acted reasonably in pointing weapons at a suspected murderer
whom they believed to be heavily armed).
38. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
39. Id.
40. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218-19 (1984) (stationing INS agents at exits raised
possibility of questioning on attempt to exit, but did not amount to seizure); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (asking drug suspect in airport to accompany federal agents
for questioning was not a seizure).
41. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555 (facts that agents did not exhibit weapons, merely requested cooperation, and encounter took place in a public area, supported finding of no seizure).
42. See, e.g., Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218-19 (employees were restricted not by police, but by
voluntary employment obligations).
43. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (holding that a defendant who ran
from a cruising marked police car and discarded evidence while the police car followed him at a
normal speed was not seized). The Court found that the police actions did not communicate "to
the reasonable person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon the [defendant's) freedom
of movement." Id. at 575.
44. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
45. Id. at 629.
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restricted freedom is a prerequisite of a seizure, it does not, without more, define a seizure.' A seizure requires either compliance with a show of
authority or actual physical restraint.'
The Supreme Court addressed police-citizen encounters aboard public
transportation in Florida v. Bostick.' Bostick was aboard a bus during a
scheduled layover when he was approached by officers who asked to search
his luggage.4 9 Bostick reluctantly complied and the officers discovered that
the luggage contained cocaine.5" The Supreme Court rejected the state supreme court's finding that a reasonable person would not have felt free to
leave, and that a police-citizen encounter aboard a bus constituted a seizure
per se.5 The Court reasoned that Bostick's restricted mobility resulted from
his voluntary decision to travel by bus, rather than from any direct police
action.52 In situations where a restriction of mobility does not result from
police conduct, the applicable seizure test is whether a reasonable person
would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter.53 Echoing prior cases, the Court maintained that the totality of the
circumstances must be considered in applying this modified test.54
B. Stops Aboard Public Transportation:United States v. Little
1. Facts
After noticing a large blue suitcase in the public baggage area of a train
and detecting a suspicious chemical odor, a DEA agent approached the suspected owner (Little) in a roomette aboard the train.5 Noticing that Little had
paid cash for her one-way ticket, the agent asked her if she possessed
drugs.56 Following Little's denial, the agent asked for her consent to a search
a blue nylon bag in the roomette." The agent advised Little that she was not
under arrest and did not have to consent, so she refused.5" After Little admitted that the large blue suitcase belonged to her, the agent asked to search the
suitcase and again informed her that she did not have to consent. 9 Little
replied that she did not own the suitcase and did not know of its contents.'
The agent subjected the suitcase to a canine sniff.6 When the dog alerted the

46. Id. at 628.
47. Id. at 626.
48. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
49. Id. at 431.
50. Id. at 432.
51. Id. at 435-36.
52. The Court found that any confinement was "the natural result of [Bostick's] decision to
take the bus." Id. at 436.
53. id. at 439. The Court found this test appropriate because a refusal to cooperate, without
additional suspicious factors, does not justify lawful detention by the police. Id. at 437.
54. Id. at 439-40.
55. United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499, 1501 (10th Cir. 1994).
56. Id. at 1501-02.
57. Id. at 1502.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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agent to the presence of drugs in the suitcase, the agent arrested Little and
searched both bags after obtaining warrants.' The search yielded a total of
thirty kilograms of cocaine.63
Little was indicted for possession with intent to distribute more than five
kilograms of cocaine.' She pled not guilty and filed a motion to suppress the
evidence on the grounds that it was obtained from her luggage through an
illegal seizure without a warrant and search without probable cause. The
district court granted the motion, reasoning that a person has a higher expectation of privacy in a small room aboard a train.'
The district court also concluded that the agent's detection of a chemical
odor was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that Little's luggage
contained illegal drugs; therefore detaining the luggage for the purpose of a
canine sniff was unjustified.6' The government appealed, arguing that the encounter between the agent and Little was consensual, and that the agent had
reasonable suspicion to detain the luggage.'
2. Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the district court and
Citing Florida v. Bostick's "totality of the
remanded the case.'
circumstances" test, the court held that the district court employed the wrong
legal standard.70 Just as the Supreme Court rejected the application of a per
se rule that any police-citizen encounter aboard a bus constituted a seizure, the
Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that the location of the encounter was
determinative as to seizure.7 The court conceded that application of the totality of the circumstances test was "necessarily imprecise," but maintained that
the focus of the test--"'the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a
whole,' on a reasonable person"-would be "defeated by rules which give
determinative weight to the location of a police-citizen encounter. 7'
The Tenth Circuit went even further regarding the expectation of privacy
issue. Holding that train roomettes do not confer an expectation of privacy to
the same degree as does a home or hotel room,73 the court explicitly over-

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. The trial court explained that the private, confined space of the roomette produced a
situation where Little felt that she was not permitted to decline answering questions. Id. The court
also believed that the pointed, incriminating questions and the agent's failure to advise Little that
she was free to terminate the encounter at-will, contributed to the coercive nature of the encounter.

Id.
67. Id. at 1503.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1506.
70. Id. at 1503-04. Because the case was remanded, the court did not decide whether the
agent had reasonable suspicion to detain the luggage and subject it to a canine sniff. Id. at 1506. It
did find, however, that the agent's detection of an unidentified chemical odor did not amount to a
reasonable suspicion prior to his encounter with Little. Id.
71. Id. at 1504.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1504-05 (quoting United States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849, 853 (4th Cir. 1988),
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ruled any contrary statements in previous cases, particularly United States v.
74
Dimick.
The court criticized the district court's emphasis on the agent's failure to
advise Little of her right to refuse to answer questions, noting that there is no
per se rule requiring such an advisement. 75 Rejecting the district court's
reliance on the fact that the agent asked very pointed and incriminating questions, the court found no support that such conduct was relevant to the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the encounter. 6
3. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Judge Kelly concurred with the majority's opinion, except the portion
overruling his statement in Dimick that private rooms "on passenger trains can
be comparable to hotel rooms where an occupant enjoys a heightened expectation of privacy." 7 While Judge Kelly agreed that location is not determinative of a seizure, he believed it inappropriate to categorically reject the notion
that a person cannot expect a comparable level of privacy in a train compartment as in a hotel or motel room.7 ' According to Judge Kelly, the majority
erred in its decision to reject the issue of privacy without considering its
implications on other aspects of Fourth Amendment protection.79
In a detailed dissent, Judge Logan, joined by Chief Judge Seymour and
Judge McKay, maintained that the district court did not apply a per se test
with regard to location, nor did it apply an erroneous test in determining that
the encounter between the agent and Little constituted a non-consensual
seizure."0 He believed that the district court simply applied a balancing test,
in which it weighed as coercive the failure of the agent to advise Little that
she could refuse to answer questions, the confines of a the small, private
roomette with only one exit, and the agent's persistent, accusatory questioning."' Because he believed that Bostick represented the extreme limit of constitutional behavior, Judge Logan believed that the district court permissibly
found the additional factors coercive enough to tip the balance toward nonconsensual seizure. 2
Judge Logan agreed that Bostick was the guiding decision in Little, but he
cautioned that Bostick should be read narrowly. 3 He pointed out that the
Supreme Court did not decide that a seizure had not occurred under the facts

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983 (1988)).
74. Id. at 1504. In Dimick, 990 F.2d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 1993), the Tenth Circuit held that
private sleeper cars on passenger trains are comparable to hotel rooms, thereby enjoying a heightened expectation of privacy and requiring probable cause for intrusive police searches.
75. Little, 18 F.3d at 1505.
76. Id. at 1505-06.
77. Id. at 1506 (Kelly, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra note 74.
78. Little, 18 F.3d at 1507.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1513-14 (Logan, J., dissenting).
81. 'Id. at 1514.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1508-09.
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of Bostick.84 Rather, the Court merely required the state court to apply a totality of the circumstances evaluation instead of a per se rule.85 Judge Logan
asserted that a broad reading of Bostick led lower courts to balance conduct
that looked more like coercion against conduct that could be considered nonintimidating.86 To him, any conduct that is no more coercive than that in
Bostick is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
4. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Little is noteworthy for two reasons. First,
it broadly interpreted Bostick as holding that non-forceful police-citizen confrontations aboard confined public transportation are not seizures solely by
virtue of their location." In order to become seizures, law enforcement personnel in these situations must exhibit a much more intimidating, forceful, and
custodial posture to invoke a situation where the individual feels compelled to
cooperate.
A serious problem with Bostick's premise, as applied in Little, lies with
the court's perception of how a reasonable person views encounters with
police." The court gave too much credit to the average person's knowledge
of her rights in these situations and her ability to feel secure enough to disregard law enforcement officers.89 In reality, few people are fully aware of
their Fourth Amendment rights, most are fearful of the police, and the police
know how to exploit this to their advantage.' It has also been shown that a
person's refusal to cooperate often increases police suspicion and intensifies
their investigations.91 In light of these observations, it is difficult to understand how a reasonable person in Little's situation could know that she was
free to ignore the agent without fear of further harassment.
The Tenth Circuit has fallen in line with other circuits, but has notably
modified prior opinions, such as United States v. Ward"z and United States v.
Bloom.93 In those cases, decided after Bostick, the Tenth- Circuit gave
significant weight to location in evaluating police-citizen encounters aboard

84. Id. at 1508.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1508-09.
87. Id. at 1504; see also United States v. Carhee, 27 F.3d 1493, 1497 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Girolamo, 23 F.3d 320, 326 (10th Cir. 1994) (applying Little), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
640 (1994).
88. Michael J. Reed, Jr., Comment, Florida v. Bostick: The Fourth Amendment Takes a Back
Seat to the Drug War, 27 NEw ENG. L. REv. 825, 846 (1993).
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1301 (1990)).
91. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 447 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. 961 F.2d 1526 (10th Cir. 1992).
93. 975 F.2d 1447 (10th Cir. 1992). In United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947 (3d Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 900 (1995), the Third Circuit specifically cited the Tenth Circuit's departure from Ward and Bloom, both of which Kim relied upon as controlling in his case regarding an
encounter with police on-board a train. Id. at 951 n.1. The court pointed to the Little decision in
holding that the fact that Kim's encounter took place in a train roomette was but one factor in
considering the totality of the circumstances, and was not determinative as to whether a seizure
had occurred. Id. at 952.
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trains, finding that each encounter resulted in a seizure of the individual without reasonable suspicion. 94
As pointed out in both dissents, the Tenth Circuit has categorically
refused to extend the same expectation and protection of privacy to rooms
aboard trains that it extends to hotel/motel rooms. 95 By overruling previous
holdings and dicta recognizing a heightened expectation of privacy in private
train compartments, the Tenth Circuit has reduced the degree of police justification required for future intrusions into such compartments. The standard of
justification that the court will employ regarding searches and arrests remains
unclear. As Judge Kelly pointed out, it seems wholly inappropriate to reject
out of hand a heightened expectation of privacy in train compartments merely
to emphasize that location is not determinative in evaluating police-citizen encounters. The refusal of the court to recognize a heightened expectation of
privacy aboard train roomettes illustrates the diminished significance of location as a factor in the totality-of-circumstances test, a factor which held noticeable significance for the Tenth Circuit only two years ago.
C. Border Patrol Stops: United States v. Lopez-Martinez
1.Facts
A U.S. Border Patrol agent observed a van and sedan travelling in tandem
on the highway.96 The agent noticed four Hispanic passengers in the sedan,
but could not see well inside the van.9 7 The agent became more suspicious
when he noted that both vehicles were driving twenty-five miles an hour below the speed limit.9" The agent also saw an individual peer out the rear window of the van and then disappear from view.' A check of the van's license
plates revealed "nothing extraordinary."'" Nevertheless, the agent stopped
the van, driven by Roberto Lopez-Martinez, and verified the driver's U.S.
the van, the agent promptly discovered four
citizenship."' Upon searching
02
undocumented aliens.1
Charged with transporting illegal aliens and aiding and abetting, LopezMartinez filed a motion to suppress the evidence gathered at the stop.0 3 He

94. "The setting of the encounter... inside and within the immediate vicinity of a small
private roomette on a train, although not dispositive by itself, supports a determination that a
reasonable person ... would have felt unable to decline the officers' requests or terminate the
encounter." Ward, 961 F.2d at 1531. "In Ward, the location of the encounter in the confines of a
small private train compartment weighed heavily in our analysis." Bloom, 975 F.2d at 1453.
95. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
96. United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d 1481, 1482 (10th Cir. 1994). This particular
stretch of highway is frequently used to circumvent an important U.S.-Mexico border checkpoint.

Id.
97.
98.

Id. at 1482, 1486-87.
Id. at 1482.

99. Id. at 1483.
100. Id.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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contended that the agent did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the van." °
The district
court denied the motion and Lopez-Martinez conditionally pled
05
guilty.
2. Majority Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding
that the agent had made a reasonable inference of suspicion in light of the
circumstances and his observations." The court relied on the BrignoniPonce test to evaluate the factors that determine reasonable suspicion. 7 In
examining the totality of the circumstances, the Tenth Circuit noted that a
border patrol agent is "entitled to assess the facts in light of his experience in
detecting illegal entry and smuggling,"'" and that an officer's articulable
facts when viewed individually, "will often comport with general notions of
innocent travel."'" Taken together, however, these facts can amount to
reasonable suspicion in the eyes of a trained and experienced officer."0
Accordingly, in evaluating the facts with respect to each of the BrignoniPonce factors, the court determined that the agent's observations established
that a reasonable officer would suspect that the van driven by Lopez-Martinez
contained illegal aliens."'
3. Dissent
In his dissent, Judge McKay criticized the majority for its imprecise analysis of the justification for a Terry stop. "When the layers of gloss are
removed and the facts are analyzed accordingly, it is clear to me that [the
agent] acted on a mere hunch rather than on such articulable facts sufficient to
vest him with objective, reasonable suspicion.""' Judge McKay identified
what he perceived to be three doctrinal errors in the majority opinion. First, he
believed the majority placed undue reliance on the Brignoni-Ponce factors." 3
According to Judge McKay, seemingly suspicious facts, when properly viewed
against the backdrop of the circumstances as a whole, tend to lose significance
unless they are given the status of a factor in a test."4 Second, he criticized

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1487.
107. Id. at 1483-84. See also supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
108. Lopez-Martinez, 25 F.3d at 1484 (quoting Brignoni-Ponce,242 U.S. 873 (1975)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1485-87.
112. Id. at 1487 (McKay, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. Judge McKay wrote:
When viewed in relation to the totality, arguably suspicious facts can take on more
significance when viewed together with other related facts-thus, the whole can equal
more than the sum of its parts. Other seemingly suspicious facts, however, can lose
significance when properly viewed against the backdrop of the circumstances as a
whole, and this I believe to be the fate of many of the generic Brignoni-Poncefactors in
this case.
Id. at 1487-88.
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the majority's failure to perform a "rational inference" test of each factor
before considering it in the context of the holistic picture."' Third, he
believed that the majority excessively deferred to the agent's experience when
that experience could not be a decisive factor in making a rational inference of
suspicion. "6 "[T]o allow [the agent] to make inferences of suspicion froin
the wide-lens totality viewpoint ...comes close to granting [him] powers of
extrasensory perception.""'
4. Analysis
The Lopez-Martinez decision gives border patrol officers great latitude to
stop vehicles reasonably suspected of transporting illegal aliens. In recognizing
the unique mission of border patrol agents, the court deferred to the judgment
of these agents by allowing the piecing together of seemingly innocuous facts
and observations to create an inference of suspected criminal activity.
Although the agent's justification was evaluated by the totality of circumstances, the "totality," pointed out by the dissent, was viewed through a very
wide lens."'
If courts were not somewhat deferential to the judgment of border patrol
agents, it would be difficult for agents to justify most highway stops. Vehicles
travelling particular routes, the manner in which they travel, and the race of
the driver and passengers do not immediately conjure impressions of suspicious behavior. Indeed, in situations not involving suspected illegal immigration, these factors would hardly serve to establish reasonable suspicion. Basing
reasonable suspicion on certain "profiles" has not found favor with courts,
which insist on the articulation of specific facts and how they point to suspicious activity." 9 The Tenth Circuit, realizing the difficulty faced by border
patrol agents in executing their duties without violating the Constitution, allowed the training, experience, and judgment of these agents to be the crucial
link between innocent facts and the formulation of reasonable suspicion.
D. Exceeding the Scope of Detention: United States v. Fernandez
1. Facts
A Utah state trooper pulled over a vehicle driven by Edimiro Fernandez
after observing that it had difficulty staying in its lane, and was in probable
violation of state window-tint standards. 2 The trooper, when asking for
Fernandez's license and registration, noticed the driver's nervousness and felt

115. Id. at 1488.
116. Id. at 1489.
117. Id.
118. id.; see also United States v. Martin, 15 F.3d 943, 951 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[Rjeasonable
suspicion cannot be reduced to a 'neat set of legal rules,' and ... law enforcement officers, like
jurors, are permitted to formulate 'certain common sense conclusions about human behavior....'

(citation omitted)).
119. See, e.g., Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (factors in drug courier profile did not
articulate reasonable suspicion).
120. United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 875 (10th Cir. 1994).
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a "tension in the air."' 2 ' After completing an NCIC computer check of the
driver, passenger and vehicle, the trooper radioed for back-up and again
approached the vehicle on the driver's side. 122 Still holding Fernandez's license and registration, as well as the passenger's identification, the trooper
asked if there were any weapons, drugs, or other contraband in the
vehicle.' 23 Fernandez and the passenger replied that there were not.'24 Noticing escalated nervousness in the two men, the trooper asked to search the
vehicle.'25 The two men exited the vehicle and Fernandez consented to a
search of the interior, which yielded 123 kilograms of cocaine.'26
Fernandez was indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute. 21 The district court denied his motion to suppress the evidence
obtained from the search on Fourth Amendment grounds and he conditionally
2
pled guilty.
2. Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the ruling of the district court and
remanded the case.'29 The court held that Fernandez had been unlawfully
seized when the trooper detained him without reasonable suspicion beyond that
necessary to issue a citation. 30 Citing its previous decision in United States
v. Guzman, 3' the court reiterated the rule that a reasonable detention must
be related in scope to the circumstances that initially justified the stop. 32 Although a police officer may request a license and registration during the
course of a routine traffic stop, he must allow the driver to proceed on his
way without further questioning once the documents have been satisfactorily
produced. 133 Because the trooper retained Fernandez's license and registration while he continued to question him about weapons or drugs, the court
held that Fernandez unquestionably had been seized.'34 According to the
court, in order for the seizure to be lawful, there had to be "'specific and
articulable facts and rational inferences drawn from those facts [giving] rise to
reasonable suspicion' of additional criminal activity."'35 The court found that
the reasons given by the trooper to justify further detention of
Fernandez-irregular lane travel, nervousness of the men, and the startled
nature of the passenger upon awakening to the trooper's presence-were insuf-

121. Id. The trooper was also struck by how startled the sleeping passenger appeared upon
awakening and finding a trooper near the car. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 875-76.
124. Id. at 876.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 875.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 883.
130. Id. at 880.
131. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988).
132. Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 876-77.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 878.
135. Id. (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1990)).
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ficient to establish reasonable suspicion.'36 The court maintained that these
reasons, along with the trooper's testimony regarding his "sixth sense,"
"tension in the air," and his belief that something was "afoot," suggested that
the trooper was "acting more
on an unparticularized hunch than on reasonable
37
and objective suspicion."'
3. Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Brown argued that the court did not adequately
consider the totality of the circumstances with deference to the unique viewpoint of the law enforcement officer. 3 He thought that the district court
relied upon the appropriate test and properly determined that the series of facts
pointed out by the trooper, when considered together, warranted further
investigation.13 1 Judge Brown noted that the district court found that the
defendant's nervousness went beyond that which most people demonstrate
during a routine traffic stop, and that only a law enforcement officer could
make such an evaluation at the time it occurred."4 By viewing the totality of
the circumstances through the eyes of the trooper with deference to the
trooper's judgment and experience, the district court, in Judge Brown's
opinion, came to a more accurate conclusion about the situation. 4 '
4. Analysis
In Fernandez, the Tenth Circuit made it clear that in traffic stops, any
detention of an individual beyond the scope of the traffic violation requires
objective, reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity. 42 In viewing
the totality of the circumstances offered by the police officer, the court
focused on the rational connection of those circumstances to the formulation
of reasonable suspicion. While the court still gives considerable deference to
an officer's training and experience, an officer is still required to offer
substantive facts that point to suspicion of criminal conduct beyond the facts
which served as the basis for the initial stop. Otherwise, the detention will
constitute an unconstitutional seizure. When the substance of the holistic
picture is weak, the court is likely to find that reasonable suspicion was
43
lacking.
The degree of deference given to police by the Tenth Circuit in this situation appears to be more limited than that given in border patrol stops. Unlike
border patrol stops, the court refused to allow the experience and judgment of

136. Id. at 880.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 883-87 (Brown, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 886-88.
140. Id. at 886.
141. Id. at 886-88.
142. Id. at 877-78; see also United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 561-62 (10th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1994).
143. The Tenth Circuit was not the only circuit last year to address this issue. In United
States v. Ramos, 20 F.3d 348, 352 (8th Cir. 1994), the Eighth Circuit held that detaining a driver
beyond the period necessary to issue a traffic citation constituted a seizure which required
reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity beyond that of the traffic offense. Id.
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an officer to bridge the gap between facts of questionable substance and
criminal suspicion. While it appears that the experience and judgment of an
officer is the key to determining reasonable suspicion in border patrol
encounters, the substance of the facts articulated by an officer is the key to
Fernandez-type encounters. Although Fernandez addressed the reasonable
suspicion necessary to prolong an investigatory stop, it illustrated that
deference to police judgment is limited.
E.

Use or Threat of Force in a Terry Stop:
United States v. Melendez-Garcia
1. Facts

Melendez-Garcia ("Melendez") and two other men suspected of
transporting marijuana, were under surveillance by the DEA and the Las
Cruces, New Mexico police.'" The officers had also been informed of the
suspects' location and travel arrangements. 5 When the suspects left a motel
and proceeded on the highway in two cars, the officers followed and stopped
them." When the officers pulled over the two vehicles, they conducted what
they termed a "felony stop."' 47 The officers handcuffed each suspect, frisked
them and strapped them with seatbelts into separate police cars." A DEA
agent asked one of the suspects for consent to search the car belonging to
Melendez, but in which Melendez had not been riding.'" The suspect
answered that the agent could search the vehicle but would find nothing.50
Although a visual search revealed nothing, a canine sniff resulted in the dog
alerting the officers to the presence of drugs in the car. 5' The officers read
all three suspects their rights, and in a second search of the car, found twentyone pounds of marijuana in the gas tank.'52
Melendez was indicted for conspiracy, possession with intent to distribute
marijuana, and aiding and abetting.'53 He filed a motion to suppress the
evidence, arguing that he had been arrested without probable cause and that
the consent to search the car had been tainted by the illegal arrest.'54 The
district court ruled that reasonable suspicion justified the stop of the three men
and, despite the potentially coercive nature of the stop, Melendez voluntarily

144. United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1049-50 (10th Cir. 1994).
145. Id. at 1049.
146. Id. at 1050.
147. Id. The officers drew their weapons, pointed them at the vehicles, ordered that the ignition keys be thrown from the windows, and ordered the suspects to put their hands outside, exit
the vehicles one at a time, and walk backward toward the officers. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1050.
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consented to a search of the vehicle."' Melendez conditionally pled guilty
and appealed.' 56
2. Opinion
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case.' 57
The Tenth Circuit held that conducting a "felony stop" exceeded the scope of
reasonable suspicion that justified the stop, and therefore the men had been
arrested without probable cause. 5 The court agreed with the district court
that the information the officers obtained and corroborated with their observations was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the two vehicles. 59 However, the court held that the government did not demonstrate that the circumstances justified the use of weapons
or confinement." 6
The court noted that no bright-line rule exists to determine whether police
conduct exceeds the scope of an investigatory stop, and that the evaluation is
"guided by 'common sense and ordinary human experience."'6 The court
also pointed out that the use of firearms, handcuffs, or other forceful
techniques does not automatically transform a Terry stop into a full custodial
arrest requiring proof of probable cause. 62 The use or threat of force,
however, must be warranted under a "reasonable person" evaluation of the
circumstances.'63 The court found that drugs, guns, and violence often go
together and may be a factor in considering the actions of the officers;
however, there was no evidence or testimony that would reasonably lead the
officers to believe that the suspects were armed or dangerous, or that the
circumstances warranted such inordinate intrusiveness.'" The court found no
satisfactory explanation for the officers' "felony stop" when the officers outnumbered the suspects, the officers executed the stop on an open highway in
daylight, the officers had no information or observations that the suspects were
armed or dangerous, and the suspects fully complied with police orders.' 5
3. Analysis
The decision in Melendez-Garcia clearly illustrates the Tenth Circuit's
position on the use of force during an investigatory stop. The court permits
greater latitude to police to ensure their personal safety when arresting sus-

155.

Id.

156. Id. at 1051.
157. Id. at 1056. With regard to the question of the voluntariness of the consent to search the
vehicle, the court remanded the issue to the district court with guidance as to the proper constitutional standard, based on the Tenth Circuit's determination that the defendant had been subjected
to an illegal arrest.
158. Id. at 1053.
159. Id. at 1051.
160. Id. at 1052-53.
161. Id. at 1052 (quoting United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1562 (10th Cir. 1993)).
162. Id.
163. Id.

164. Id. at 1052-53. The court pointed out that "the naked fact that drugs are suspected will
not support a per se justification for use of guns and handcuffs in a Terry stop." Id. at 1053.
165. Id.
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pected felons. Drawn guns, handcuffs, and confinement in vehicles are not
considered by the court to be over-intrusive, provided that the officers can
establish a reasonable basis for their actions." The most important factors in
justifying forceful actions appear to be the officers' knowledge of the defendant and his criminal background (armed, dangerous, or propensity for
violence), the environment at the scene of the seizure (rural or residential), and
the actions of the defendant (combative or cooperative). 6 However, some
articulable support for an officer's belief that the situation warrants the use of
force must exist."6 Otherwise, absent probable cause, such an intrusion on
personal liberty constitutes an illegal custodial arrest.'

II. SEIZURE OF LUGGAGE

A. Background
Under the Fourth Amendment, the seizure of personal property requires
probable cause. 7 ' In United States v. Place,' the Supreme Court held that
police may briefly detain a traveler's luggage if reasonable suspicion exists
that the bag contains contraband or other criminal evidence.'
Citing Place,
the Tenth Circuit held in United States v. Hall'73 that "[liaw enforcement
officers may seize and briefly detain.., luggage provided that the officers
have reasonable articulable suspicion that [it] contains narcotics."' 74 Because
seizure of personal baggage from an individual's immediate possession is
particularly intrusive on both the individual's possessory interest in property
and liberty interest in proceeding with his "travel plans, brief seizures of
personal property must be reasonable.'75 The reasonableness of the seizure
depends upon the diligence of the police in conducting the investigation quickly, the duration of the seizure, and whether the police transported the luggage
to a different location from where it was originally seized.'76 As with individuals, personal property may not be subjected to an intrusive search without
probable cause.'77

166. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
167. See Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d at 1052-53.
168. Id.
169. See United States v. Eylicio-Montoya, 18 F.3d 845, (10th Cir. 1994) (officers did not
have probable cause to arrest vehicle occupants prior to discovery of evidence in the vehicle).
170. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see supra note 14.
171. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
172. Id. at 706. The holding reflects that the same standards governing investigatory
detentions of persons also apply to detentions of personal effects. Id. at 708-09.
173. 978 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1992).
174. Id. at 620 (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 706).
175. See Place, 462 U.S. at 708-10.
176. Id.
177. Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 542 (1990).
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B. United States v. Moore
1. Facts
DEA agents conducting routine surveillance of a train station were informed that three people who boarded the train in San Bernardino, California,
made a cash purchase of tickets from the conductor.' An agent approached
two of the men, one of whom was Michael Moore, and asked to speak with
them.'79 Moore immediately left for the rest room. 8° In Moore's absence,
the other passenger claimed that the two had boarded the train in Los Angeles
and were returning to Chicago.'' The agent noted that the ticket indicated
that the men boarded the train in San Bernardino and had paid a penalty in the
purchase price because the ticket was purchased on board while the ticket
office was open.8 2 The agent received permission to search the passenger's
bag, which contained no contraband. 3 The passenger told the agent that the
other bags in the compartment belonged to Moore.'84
The agent located Moore, who told the agent he was traveling from Los
Angeles to Chicago.' They returned to Moore's seat, and Moore consented
to a search of his garment bag but refused consent to search the duffle bag
under his seat.'86 The agent seized the bag and told Moore that the bag
would be sent to Chicago before Moore arrived if it contained nothing incriminating. 7 The agent then removed the bag from the train and subjected it to
a canine sniff.88 After the dog alerted the agent to the presence of drugs in
the bag, the agent obtained a search warrant and discovered two kilograms of
cocaine in the bag.' 89
Moore was indicted on charges of possession with intent to distribute
cocaine and aiding and abetting." 9 He filed a motion to suppress the
evidence obtained from the bag on the grounds that the bag was seized without reasonable suspicion.' The district court denied the motion and Moore
conditionally pled guilty.'92

178. United States v. Moore, 22 F.3d 241, 242 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 238
(1994).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 242-43. The train departed a few minutes after the bag was removed by the agent.
Id. at 247.
189. Id. at 243.
190. Id. at 242.
191. Id. at 243.
192. Id. at 242.
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2. Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the
facts enumerated by the district court adequately supported the conclusion that
the agent had reasonable suspicion to detain Moore's luggage and subject it to
a canine sniff.'93 In considering the totality of the circumstances, the court
held that the defendant's lie regarding his boarding location, coupled with his
cash ticket purchase in the face of a penalty, were sufficient for the agent to
formulate reasonable suspicion.' 94
3. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Judge Logan detailed two bases for reversal. First, he
believed that there was no reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure of
Moore's bag after he denied consent to its search. 9 Second, "probable cause
was required to hold [the] bag for a period extending beyond the train's
departure, and no such probable cause existed."'9 6 Judge Logan disagreed
with the majority's finding that the defendant's lie about where he boarded the
train and the penalty factor in purchasing the ticket on board provided an
objective basis for establishing reasonable suspicion.'97 He also argued that
the lie about the defendant's point of origin could be "reasonably interpreted
as merely a reference to the general area from which [Moore] and his
companions were coming", and in any event, did not give rise to reasonable
suspicion. 9
Judge Logan referred to three Tenth Circuit cases-Hall, Ward, and
Bloom-where "more egregious" facts than those in Moore were found not to
constitute reasonable suspicion."l Judge Logan's skepticism of the majority's
deference to the judgment of law enforcement officers was evident:
The government asks that we rely upon the expertise of experienced
lawmen and the alleged infallibility of unidentified train personnel.
But such reliance gives unreviewable discretion to law officers; the
only cases that get to the courts are those in which the officers find
contraband.... As I read the majority opinion any three ordinarylooking retirees who board a train in a suburb but identify their
origination as the city and who pay cash for their tickets on board,
can have their luggage seized against their will .... I am unwilling to
rely upon the tacit assumption that such a thing will not happen to

193. Id. at 243-44.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 244 (Logan, J., dissenting).
196. Id.
197. Id. Judge Logan maintained that there could be many reasons why the ticket was purchased with cash, and that a person arriving late to the train station may consider the penalty for
an on-board ticket purchase trivial in comparison to the inconvenience of waiting in line at the
ticket office. Id.
198. Id. Judge Logan pointed out that an admission that Moore boarded the train in Los Angeles should have "generate[d] more suspicion than a reference to San Bernardino." Id.
199. Id. at 244-45; see Hall, 978 F.2d at 621; Bloom, 975 F.2d at 1458-59; Ward, 961 F.2d at
1529.
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you or me, our innocent children, or people like us-that only the
guilty are accused."l
Finally, Judge Logan contended that because the agent did not have
probable cause at the time he seized the bag or when the train departed, he
exceeded the scope of a permissible detention authorized by Place."'
4. Analysis
Like the border stop in Lopez-Martinez, and unlike the prolonged
detention in Fernandez, the Moore decision gives police great latitude in
establishing the existence of reasonable suspicion. As Judge Logan's dissent
points out, however, the decision conflicts with Hall, Ward, and Bloom, where
the court rejected factors that appeared to be nothing more than drug-courier
profiles. 2 The court expressed no concern that police officers in these
situations cannot convincingly distinguish unusual legitimate conduct and
unusual suspicious conduct. Instead the court accepted the police premise that
unusual conduct is by definition suspicious.
The court's decision not to address the issue of detaining Moore's luggage
until after the train's departure ignores Moore's most compelling defense.
Requiring a traveler to abandon his luggage in order to continue with his
itinerary, exceeds the brief and minimally-intrusive detention authorized in
Place. 3 While the fact that Moore was not personally detained may mitigate
the intrusive effect of seizing his luggage, the intrusive effect on his possessory interest was greatly enhanced. 4 Arguably, the government's interest in
controlling drug trafficking does not outweigh the substantial inconvenience of
depriving an individual of his possessory interest in his personal property for
several hours or days.
Other courts, however, support the Tenth Circuit's position. The Third
Circuit in United States v. Frost 5 held that an eighty-minute delay of the
defendant's luggage to subject it to a canine sniff was not unreasonable because the police were diligent in their efforts to procure a canine unit.2"6 The
court placed primary emphasis on the diligence of the police and discounted as

200. Moore, 22 F.3d at 246 (Logan, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 248. Judge Logan also argued that the court should have addressed the issue of the
excessive time of detention of the luggage, despite the fact that it was not sufficiently raised by
defense counsel at trial. Id. at 246. He reminded that the court could consider such an issue if
"consideration is necessary to prevent manifest injustice." Id. Judge Logan maintained that Moore,
although a criminal engaged in drug trafficking, was a "victim of unconstitutional police
behavior." Id.
202. Id. at 244-45. The Tenth Circuit had found no reasonable suspicion in these cases; all
three defendants had purchased a one-way ticket in cash. Id.
203. Id. at 246-48. See United States v. Scales, 903 F.2d 765, 769 (10th Cir. 1990) (sevenhour luggage detention exceeds Place's briefness requirement); United States v. Cagle, 849 F.2d
924, 927 (5th Cir. 1988) (ninety-minute detention unreasonable); Moya v. United States, 761 F.2d
322, 327 (7th Cir. 1984) (three-hour detention of bag unreasonable); United States v. Puglisi, 723
F.2d 779, 790 (11 th Cir. 1984) (140-minute detention unreasonable).
204. Moore, 22 F.3d at 248.
205. 999 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 573 (1993).
206. Id. at 742.
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minimal the inconvenience20 caused
to the defendant by having to depart on his
7
flight without his luggage.
CONCLUSION

The 1994 Tenth Circuit decisions pertaining to seizure of individuals and
their property in the course of investigatory detentions provide police with
wide latitude in formulating reasonable suspicion. In situations where seizure
has occurred, the court still requires articulable facts, not suppositions, that
rationally point to a conclusion of reasonable suspicion. It appears, however,
that these facts are usually viewed in a light more favorable to the police.
The totality of circumstances surrounding a police-citizen encounter determines whether a seizure has occurred. Emphasis on any single factor, such as
location, conflicts with the court's current "totality of circumstances" analysis.
Specifically, the court diminished the significance of location as a factor in
evaluating police-citizen encounters, and limited the areas in which an individual enjoys a heightened expectation of privacy from government intrusion.
Anthony J. Fabian

207. Id. at 741-42. But see United States v. $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051,
1060 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Even if government agents were perfectly diligent.., a seizure without
probable cause could still last too long to pass muster under the Fourth Amendment.").

